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Abstract
Group loans with joint liability have been a distinguishing feature of many micronance
programs. While such lending has benetted millions of borrowers, major lending insti-
tutions have acknowledged their limited impact among the very poor and have recently
favored individual contracts. This paper attempts to understand these empirical patterns
using a model in which there is a single investment project and access to credit is limited
by weak repayment incentives. We show that in the absence of large social sanctions, the
poorest borrowers are oered individual and not group contracts. When both types of
contracts are feasible, the relative gains from group loans are shown to be decreasing in
loan size. We compare the role of bank enforcement with social sanctions and nd that
bank enforcement is more eective in increasing outreach while social sanctions raise the
welfare of infra-marginal borrowers. Finally, we explore the welfare eects of group size
and nd that those requiring small loans are better served by larger groups but group size
eects are, in general, ambiguous.
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11 Introduction
The ideology and practice of poverty alleviation has been deeply inuenced by the idea that
access to credit can empower the poor. Micronance programs around the world cover millions
of borrowers and are provided under a variety of dierent institutional arrangements. Although
overall gains from such lending are widely acknowledged, there is concern about their failure
to reach those at the bottom of the income distribution. There is a lively debate, but little
consensus, on how these institutions can be better designed to serve poor families. An important
question within this debate is whether group loans with joint liability provide marginal borrowers
with adequate repayment incentives.
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh rst popularized group loans in the 1970s and similar ap-
proaches were subsequently adopted by hundreds of organizations across the world. It was
believed that joint liability would generate social pressure on borrowers to repay loans and help
create a nancially sustainable model of lending. In recent years, this strategy has been ques-
tioned and individual loan contracts have become an integral part of micronance. In 2002, the
Grameen Bank replaced their hallmark model of group lending with Grameen II, under which
all members were individually liable for their loans and the group structure was maintained
mainly to foster solidarity within villages. Following the introduction of the new system, the
total number of borrowers increased from 3 to 8 million.1 This trend is by no means universal.
An interesting contrast is provided by the micronance sector in India which adheres fairly
strictly to joint liability contracts.2
1Wright et al. (2006) examine membership trends until 2005 and report that \Grameen took 27 years to reach
2.5 million members- and then doubled that in the full establishment of Grameen II". The Grameen Bank's own
website currently reports membership of about 8 million. Particularly interesting is the admission by the bank
that very poor individuals are often best served outside groups (Grameen Bank, 2009):
A destitute person does not have to belong to a group...Bringing a destitute woman to a level
where she can become a regular member of a group will be considered as a great achievement of a
group.
2The Indian micronance sector is dened to include members of Self Help Groups (SHGs) and clients of
micronance institutions (MFIs). On March 31, 2007, there were an estimated 39.9 million SHG members and
14.1 million MFI clients (Srinivasan (2009), p 5, Table 1.2). Examples of large micronance institutions that use
group loans with joint liability can be found in Field and Pande (2008) and Banerjee et al. (2009). Ghate (2008)
contains a classication of 129 recognized micronance institutions in India according to the type of lending
contracts oered (Table A.2).
1The empirical literature on the selection and performance of borrowers in the micronance sector
suggests that the poorest families are under-represented in credit groups both through biases
in branch location and the selection of clients and members within villages (Morduch, 1988).
Once groups are created, attrition rates appear to be higher for the socially disadvantaged,
perhaps because they have less to gain from group membership and because of exclusionary
practices within groups (Baland et al., 2008). Gin e and Karlan (2009) examine the role of
contractual structure on repayment rates through the randomized assignment of individual and
joint liability across similar borrowers in the Philippines. They nd that, on average, there is
no signicant dierence in these rates across the two regimes.
This paper is motivated by the correlations observed between poverty and the benets from
group lending. We would like to explain why group lending is viable and valuable in providing
credit for moderately poor households but not for the very poor. There are many plausible
reasons for this which are not directly related to the incentive structure of credit contracts.
Poor families may not have the characteristics or networks required for entrepreneurial success
or transactions costs of lending to them may be high. We abstract from these dierences and
focus on the relative gains from group and individual lending for a population of borrowers with
identical investment opportunities but heterogeneous initial wealth. We show that borrowers
requiring the smallest loans face the most favorable interest rates under joint liability and, for
high enough loans sizes, borrowers may be strictly better o with individual liability than with
group loans.
Our work is most closely related to a well-established theoretical literature that relates joint
liability to borrower incentives and illustrates multiple mechanisms through which group loans
can aect investment decisions and repayment rates.3 Groups may keep out risky borrowers
(Ghatak, 1999) and monitor their eort and choice of projects (Stiglitz, 1990; Banerjee et
al., 1994) To understand the distributional eects of group lending, we ignore questions of
borrower and project selection and focus on the incentives for loan repayment under alternative
liability regimes. This was rst studied by Besley and Coate (1995) in the context of two-person
groups with identical loan requirements. In their model, joint liability has ambiguous eects on
repayment rates. While it allows for the pooling of risks within a group, it also increases the
total repayment burden for successful borrowers. This may lead to group default in cases where
one of the borrowers would have repaid the bank under an individual contract.
3Comprehensive surveys of this literature can be found in Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Armendariz de
Aghion and Morduch (2005).
2We build on this basic idea using a more general framework which allows us to explore the
dierential benets of group lending to borrowers with varying initial levels of wealth. We use
n-person groups and show how interest rates under group lending are determined endogenously
by expected repayment rates. Larger per member loans limit risk-pooling possibilities and are
associated with lower repayment rates. As a result, equilibrium interest rates and expected
bank sanctions are increasing in loan size under joint liability contracts while they do not vary
for individual loans. It is this dierence that generates many of our results. Given project
characteristics, poorer borrowers are more likely to be sanctioned not only because their loans
are bigger but also because interest rates on these loans are higher. This higher cost of borrowing
for the poor has not appeared in the two-person, partial equilibrium framework used in the joint
liability literature but has been central to the study of income dynamics and the eciency of
investment decisions in the presence of credit constraints (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and
Newman, 1993).
Our model can also be used to assess the relative importance of formal and informal mechanisms
for enforcing credit contracts and inofrm the design of policies for greater credit outreach among
the poor. Discussions of informal networks for contract enforcement often imply that social
sanctions are near-perfect substitutes for the punishment practices of the formal banking system.
We illustrate a more nuanced interaction of these two enforcement mechanisms. We show
that stronger bank sanctions always extend credit market access among the poor while social
sanctions do so only under certain conditions. Social sanctions on the other hand are more
eective in raising the welfare of inframarginal borrowers because these sanctions are never
implemented in equilibrium.
We also explore the eects of group size since organizations vary quite widely in the sizes of
groups that they allow. We show that for groups with small enough loans, two member groups
are never optimal. For larger loan sizes, the eects of group size on borrower welfare can go
either way and we provide some examples that illustrate this non-monotonicity.
Taken together, these results suggest that joint liability can increase borrower welfare but gains
from such lending depend on loan sizes and therefore on the initial distribution of wealth. Its
ability to provide the poor access to credit depends both on the strength of social networks
within a group and on the characteristics of the projects undertaken. In many cases, the
poorest households may be best served by providing them individual loans on more favorable
terms and promoting alternative programs of poverty alleviation. Strategies to expand rural
credit probably require a mix of contractual arrangements and the excessive focus on group
lending that we have seen in recent years may be misplaced.
32 The model
Our principal unit of analysis is a set of risk neutral households each of whom can choose to
invest in a project. The project requires one unit of capital and no other inputs.4 It yields a
return  with probability  and zero otherwise. Households with inadequate capital can borrow
from a competitive banking system either as individuals or as members of groups of size n with
joint liability. Project returns are observed within the group but are unobservable to the bank.
Banks oer depositors a gross return of r which is the opportunity cost of bank funds. The
interest rates charged to lenders vary with repayment rates in a manner that equates the ex-
pected return from all contracts to r. Banks have available a non-pecuniary sanction K which
can be imposed on defaulting borrowers. In the case of non-repayment of group loans, all group
members are sanctioned K. In addition to bank sanctions, groups may impose social sanctions
which inict a utility cost  on sanctioned members and are costless to others in the group.
We follow the existing literature on group lending by assuming these sanctions are exogenously
given.5
We begin by characterizing individual contracts. Unsuccessful borrowers must default on their
loans because their projects have zero returns. Banks limit loan sizes to ensure all successful
borrowers prefer repayment to sanctions and break even when charging a gross interest rate
r
. Total payments for a household borrowing L are then given by Lr






If K < r
, the largest available loan is less than one and households with initial wealth less than
(1   Li) cannot invest in the project. We assume that this is indeed the case because we are
interested in whether joint liability can extend credit access to households who are not eligible
for individual contracts.






4Costs of eort are easily incorporated. In our model the project returns can be interpreted as being net of
these costs. While we have in mind the self-employment projects nanced by many micronance organizations,
we do not introduce this term because no eort decision is modeled.
5In practice the nature of bank and social sanctions is complex and might vary with borrower characteristics.
By abstracting from these complexities, we are better able to compare the eects of joint and individual liability
within a given enforcement structure.
4(1   )K   rw, which simplies to
Ui =    r   (1   )K: (2)
As long as Ui is positive, individuals strictly prefer investing in the project. This requires the








Group contracts are complicated by the fact that interest rates depend on loan size and the re-
payment strategies of members. As in most such coordination games, there are many equilibria.
We restrict our attention to the symmetric repayment equilibrium with the smallest positive
contributions by each member. This assumes away coordination problems within the group and
allows us to better focus on the relationship between loan sizes and interest rates.
To see how interest rates vary by loan size, consider a group with n members with the same
initial wealth w.6 Each member requires a loan of L = (1   w) to invest in the project and the
group borrows nL. The interest rate charged on this amount depends on the bank's assessment
of the probability of repayment, or equivalently, the fraction of such groups that will repay the
loan. Denote by B(j), the binomial probability of j or more successes within the group7 and





L  min(;K + ): (4)
If groups repay whenever they have at least ~ j successful projects, banks break even by charging
an interest rate r
B(~ j).The contribution of each successful member is n
j
r
B(j)L where j  ~ j. We
require this amount to be lower than project returns  and the sum of bank and social sanctions
K + . The denition of ~ j in (4) ensures that this is the case. The group lending contract is
6The assumption of uniform wealth within groups allows us to abstract from questions of within group
redistribution to better focus on the risk pooling function of joint liability which is our main interest. In practice,
most group lending programs have tried to ensure that members within groups are similar in terms of their initial
endowments. At the start of the Indian microcredit program for example, non-government organizations were
issued guidelines by the central banking authorities that explicitly directed them to foster savings and credit
groups among households of \homogeneous background and interest" (National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development, 1992).
7To be more precise, this is the probability of at least j successes in n trials when the probability of success on
each trial equal to . We refer to this by B(n;j;) whenever there is ambiguity about the n and  in question.
5given by (L; r
B(~ j);K) . Whenever the number of successes in a group happens to be greater than
~ j, actual contributions are lower than the maximum contributions that members are willing to
make.8
It is worth specifying how social sanctions are used by the group to enforce repayment. The
interest rate on a group loan is based on the probability of ~ j successes. If fewer successes are
realized in the group, the group defaults, the bank sanctions all members and no social sanctions
are used. If, on the other hand, more than ~ j successes are realized, each successful member
contributing less than their equal share n
j
r
B(j)L towards repayment faces social sanctions.9
We summarize the above discussion before proceeding to our results. For each household,
initial wealth denes the loan required to undertake the project. Depending on the size of
this loan, it may be available under an individual contract or a joint liability loan within an
n member group or both, or neither. If the loan is available, it is taken under the contractual
arrangment that best suits the borrower, investments are made and returns are realized. These
returns are observed by members within groups but not by the bank. In the case of individual
contracts, each household with a successful project chooses between reimbursing the bank and
being sanctioned K. Unsuccessful households are always sanctioned. In the case of group
loans, successful members simultaneously decide on contributions towards bank repayment after
project returns are realized. If available contributions are high enough, repayment is made. If
not, the bank sanctions each member K and successful members who do not contribute their
share may be subject to social sanctions .
3 Credit outreach under joint liability
We are now in a position to examine the conditions under which joint liability extends credit
to those who have no access to individual loan contracts. Denote by Lg the largest loan that
is oered under joint liability. This is the value of L at which the function jB(j) takes its
maximum value and (4) holds with equality. The following lemma establishes the shape of this
8There may be other integers for which (4) holds. We are interested in the smallest of these because it
corresponds to the lowest interest rate and therefore the most favorable group contract.
9Notice that the size of these sanctions does not depend on the number of successful projects or the fraction
of members who contribute. One can think of them as simply arising from a group rule that stipulates social
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Figure 1: Maximum Group Loans
function and will be useful in establishing many of our results. All proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 1. The function jB(j) is single-peaked. It starts at zero, takes the value nn at j = n
and attains a maximum at j  dne. If  < 1
n, it is decreasing for j  1 and, if  >
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1);
it is increasing throughout.10
Figure 1 illustrates the maximum loan size available under individual and group contracts for
three dierent levels of project uncertainty, namely  = f:05;:5;:9g. In each case, the group
size n = 16, K
r = :9 and social sanctions  = 0. The largest individual loans available are
represented by the three horizontal lines. Using Equation (4), the maximum group loans are
given by Lg = K
r
jB(j)
n . When  = :05, the function jB(j) is maximized at j = 1 and this is
therefore the value of j corresponding to the largest group loan. In this case the largest group
loan is 0:03 while the largest individual loan is :045. In the other two cases, the function is
hump shaped. When  = :5, the largest group loan corresponds to j = 7 which is below the
mean n = 8 and in each case j is below n. The maximum group loans are always below the
largest individual loans. The following proposition establishes that this is generally true when
groups do not have access to social sanctions.
Proposition 1. In the absence of social sanctions the largest loan available in a group lending
contract is strictly smaller than in an individual contract.
Proposition 1 implies that, absent social sanctions, group lending does not reach those who
10dxe denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
7are denied individual loans. This result is driven by the fact that banks extract less from
projects nanced by group loans. With no social sanctions, individuals, whether or not they
are in groups, can be induced to pay the bank at most K. Under an individual contract, all
successful projects repay the bank and therefore a fraction  of all loans are repaid. Under
group lending, groups with too few successes default and pay nothing, while in groups where
more than a fraction  of their members succeed, each of them pays less than they would have
under an individual loan. These leakages cause interest rates on group loans to rise above those
on individual loans and (4) cannot therefore hold for loans of size Li.
The ambiguous eects of joint liability in the absence of social sanctions have been recognized
in earlier work. Besley and Coate (1995) show that joint liability can increase the burden of
debt on those with successful projects and thereby lower repayment rates. Our contribution
here is to link repayment rates to required loan sizes and to the interest rates charged by banks.
At Li, we show that repayment rates are always lower under group liability and interest rates
are higher. As a result, the incentive compatibility condition in (4) fails and group loans of this
size are not feasible.
A natural next question is the degree to which social sanctions can extend outreach. Such
sanctions relax the incentive compatibility constraint and allow a larger share of project returns
to be extracted from each successful member. This increases possibilities for risk pooling and
allows groups to repay the bank loan in states with fewer successful projects. Notice however
from (4) that higher sanctions can only improve repayment incentives as long as the total value
of bank and social sanctions are below the project return . Beyond this point group members
have nothing left to contribute and it is not repayment incentives but project returns that
restrict the size of group loans. The following proposition outlines the conditions under which
social sanctions allow households requiring more than Li to obtain credit through group loans.
Proposition 2. Let social sanctions       K. Then Li is a feasible group loan if either of
the following conditions hold:
1. n = 2
2.   1
2 and n is an integer
3.   1
4
In contrast, for large ,  =   and n > 2, there always exist loan sizes which will be oered as
individual loans but not as group loans even if social sanctions are arbitrarily large.
8The above result highlights the risk-pooling aspect of group lending. When project uncertainty
or risk is high, returns in the good state must be correspondingly high and social sanctions
allow these to be extracted. Note also that the two-member groups that have been exclusive
focus of much of the existing literature on group lending are a particular case whose properties
do not generalize to larger groups.
4 Contractual choice and welfare
We have so far discussed the maximum size of group and individual loans that banks are willing
to oer. For those eligible for both types of loans, contractual choice will depend on their
relative welfare gains under the two regimes. The net gain from investing in the project under
individual liability has already been derived in Equation (2) and shown to be independent of the
amount borrowed. For group loans, recall that ~ j is the minimum number of successes required
for repayment. Denote by j the binomial probability of exactly j successes in n trails with a
probability of success  in each trial.
The expected utility gain for each member can be derived as the sum of two terms, one for




























The rst sum on the RHS is the expected gain for all states in which the group defaults because
j < ~ j and the bank sanctions all members. In such cases, the member keeps the return  if his
project is successful, which happens with probability
j
n. The second sum is for all states with
bank repayment and all successful members contributing their share. We simplify the above
expression to obtain
Ug(~ j) =    r   K
~ j 1 X
j=0
j =    r  
 
1   B(~ j)

K (5)
using B(~ j) =
Pn




Since ~ j is increasing in loan-size and Ug(~ j) is decreasing in ~ j, groups with larger loans derive
lower benets from group loans.
9We can now use (2) and (5) to express the dierence in utility between a group loan and an
individual loan of the same size as
Ug   Ui = [B(~ j)   ]K: (6)
The gain from group relative to individual contracts is simply equal to the dierence in the
probability of being sanctioned by the bank. This is because banks interest rates are set to
extract the same amount in expected terms from each contract and no social sanctions are
applied in equilibrium. Payments in each state by groups and households dier, but these
dierences are oset by the probability with which those states occur. We therefore have the
following result:
Proposition 3. The benets from group contracts are decreasing in loan size. Group loans are
preferred to individual loans if the probability of group repayment is greater than .
For small enough loans, group contracts are always strictly preferred. To see this, consider a
loan that can be repaid with only one success in the group. Since B(1) = 1 (1   )
n, Equation
(6) can be written as
Ug   Ui = [1   (1   )
n   ]K = [(1   )   (1   )
n]K > 0
In general, the gain from group loans need not be positive. It may well be that a group loan
is feasible, in that groups have the correct incentives to repay, yet the expected utility of each
their members is higher under an individual contract. Since the minimum number of successes
required for repaying a loan ~ j(L) is increasing in loan size and the probability of obtaining these,
B(~ j) is decreasing in ~ j, we may have B(~ j) < . As an example, note that when  approaches
1, the largest group loans are those require all n members to have successful projects. In this
case B(n) = n. Since this is less than , individual loans, if available, are strictly preferred.
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium distribution of group and individual
contracts for dierent levels of wealth and with and without social sanctions. For a given
investment project, those with high enough initial wealth always select group contracts. In the
absence of social sanctions, the largest group loan is smaller than the largest individual loan
and marginal investors always take individual loans. Those with wealth below (1   Li) cannot
invest. Social sanctions raise both the maximum size of group loans and the benets from group
lending. When project uncertainty and social sanctions are both high, individual loans are not
chosen in equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
10individual
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Figure 2: Loan size and contractual choice
5 Formal and informal enforcement
Informal networks have been recognized as playing an important role in facilitating exchange
when formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak. The sanctions imposed within these
networks have often been perceived as a near substitute for legal enforcement. In this section,
we revisit this question in the context of micronance by comparing the eects of bank and
social sanctions on credit outreach and borrower welfare.
We have already shown that in the absence of social sanctions, the largest group loans Lg are
smaller than corresponding individual loans, Li. We now examine how each of these change
with a marginal increase in bank and social sanctions respectively. Recall that Li = K
r and
assuming   K + , Lg =
jB(j)
nr (K + ). We see from these expressions that changes in
bank and social sanctions have identical marginal eects on group loans and that the eect of
bank sanctions, K, on individual loans is bigger than on group loans because n > jB(j)
(Proposition 1). This leads us to the following result:
Proposition 4. Social sanctions are never more eective than bank sanctions in increasing
credit outreach. If Lg > Li social sanctions and bank sanctions have identical eects on the
maximum size of group loans. If Li  Lg, maximal outreach is achieved through bank sanctions
on individual loans.
We see from the above discussion that enforcement through the banking system always does
11better in increasing access to credit. In contrast, we now show that social sanctions are much
more eective than bank sanctions is raising the utility of those already using group loans.
Proposition 5. For borrowers choosing group loans, higher social sanctions always raise wel-
fare. Bank sanctions can sometimes raise welfare but to a lesser extent. For individual loans,
higher bank sanctions always lower welfare.
Since social sanctions are never used in equilibrium, they always raise the benets from group
lending because they result in a more favorable group contract. The threat of being sanctioned
allows groups to extract more from successful projects and the value of ~ j in their group contract
is therefore lower. Bank sanctions on the other hand, are used in equilibrium and may either
increase or decrease borrower utility depending on whether the gains from a lower probability of
being sanctioned by the bank are oset by the higher level of the sanction when it is imposed. For
individual loans, higher bank sanctions always lower utility because their frequency is insensitive
to the level of the sanction and stays unchanged at (1   ). We see therefore that both types
of sanctions increase the relative gain from group loans.
6 The eects of group size
We do not have a complete characterization of the relationship between group size and welfare.
Since the probability of repayment for an n person group is based on the number of successes as
dened by a binomial distribution, small changes in loan size can lead to jumps in repayment
probabilities and rule out a smooth relationship between the sizes of loans and groups. When
required loan sizes are suciently small, we are able to show that large groups pool risk more
eectively and two member groups are never optimal. At the other extreme, when the group
loan is at its maximum level, we are able to put a lower bound on the project success probability
 under which larger groups always result in lower borrower welfare. For arbitrary loan amounts
and project characteristics, increases in group size can either raise or lower welfare. We have
the following result:
Proposition 6. For suciently small loans, a fall in group size lowers welfare and two member
groups are never optimal. For the largest available group loans, borrower welfare is always
decreasing in group size if the probability of project sucess  
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1). For intermediate loan
sizes, borrower welfare can either increase or decrease in group size.
12To see why small loan amounts favor large groups, consider a group of three that can repay the
group loan as long as one members succeeds. This implies that at the required loan size, ^ L, the




^ L  min(;K + ): (7)
For a loan of the same size taken by a two-member group, the corresponding incentive compat-
ibility constraint would continue to hold because the LHS would now be smaller at 2  r
B(2;1;) ^ L
and the RHS of both constraints would be identical. But since B(n;1;) is strictly increasing
in n, welfare would be lower for a group of 2 which requires the same per member loan, ^ L. The
same argument would hold for other values of group size n; if the required group loan can be
repaid with only one success, a fall in group size always lowers borrower welfare.
Now consider the largest possible loan for a group of n members and a project success probability,
 
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1). We know from Lemma 1 that repayment of such a loan requires all n members
to succeed. For group of size (n   1) a loan of this size is shown to be feasible and it is welfare
improving because the probability of all group projects being successful is decreasing in n.
Moving away from these limit cases we nd non-monotonic eects of group size. Figure 3
illustrates how the optimal group contract and the per member gains from group over individual
loans changes as a function of group size. We consider all even-sized groups of between 2 and
40 members, each member requires L = :25 and the project success probability is  = :5. Bank
and social sanctions are .6 and .4 respectively and the risk free interest rate is 25 per cent.
Starting with a group of size 2, an increase in size initially lowers welfare because the optimal
contract for sizes of 4 and 6 requires at least half of the members to succeed, and the probability
of this event is decreasing in size. For a group of size 8, an additional and opposing eect comes
into play as the fraction of successes ~ j in the group lending contract falls below one-half. The
scissor pattern seen in the gains from group lending mirrors a similar pattern in the fraction of
successes
~ j
n implied by the group contract.
The details of how group size inuences borrower welfare outside the limit cases outlined in
Proposition 6 will vary with the size of the loan and project characterisitcs. The above example
is only to illustrate that general results on size eects are elusive.
13Gains from group loan
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Figure 3: Group size eects ( = :5, L = :25, K +  = 1, r = 1:2)
7 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the now common observation that group loans with joint liability
appear better suited for the moderately poor than the very poor. We show why this might be
true by examining how repayment rates and credit contracts vary by loan size. Our paper builds
on the standard approach in the group lending literature in two important respects. First, we
move away from two person groups to arbitrary group sizes. Second, we allow interest rates for
each type of contract to vary by repayment rates. Using this framework we nd that for a given
investment project, poorer borrowers face a higher cost of capital under joint liability and the
gains from group lending are therefore increasing in initial borrower wealth.
Our model isolates only one mechansim, namely repayment incentives, that can help explain
the relationship between borrower wealth and the prevalence of group lending contracts. We
have abstracted from questions of project choice and group selection that have been important
in the literature on joint liability. These are questions that are worth exploring further. Our
results in this paper suggest that the use of a more general framework than has been used so
far to examine these issues can help us better understand the distribution of gains from group
lending.
14Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The function jB(j) takes the value zero at j = 0 and is positive for all j > 0. We begin by
showing that it is decreasing to the right of dne. We then establish that it is single-peaked by
showing that, if for some j < dne; jB(j) > (j + 1)B(j + 1), then this relationship holds for
all j in the range j  j  bnc. Finally, for the case where dne = n, we derive the lower
bound on  given in the lemma for which jB(j) is increasing throughout.
1. jB(j) is decreasing to the right of j = dne:
Consider n > j  dne. The function jB(j) is strictly decreasing at j if jB(j) >
(j + 1)B(j + 1). The LHS can be written as jB(j + 1) + jj and rearranging terms gives
us the condition:
jj > B(j + 1) (8)









(j + 1)!(n   j   1)!
:













  1 if j  n; which implies
jj  j+1 + jj+1:













 > 1 for j  n,
jj+1 > j+2 + jj+2
15Combining the expressions for jj and jj+1 we get
jj > j+1 + j+2 + jj+2:




k = B(j + 1):
As a result, jB(j) is strictly decreasing to the right of dne:
2. jB(j) is single-peaked to the left of dne:
We use the property of a Binomial distribution that the mode M of the distribution is
either bnc or dne (Kaas and Buhrman, 1980).
Let us rst consider any value j0, 1  j0  bnc for which jB(j) is increasing at j0. From
(8), this implies that j0j0  B(j0 + 1): But since j is maximized at the mode, which at
least as large as j0, the LHS jj is increasing for all j < j0. The upper tail probability,
B(j + 1) is strictly decreasing in j throughout. It follows that 8j < j0, jB(j) must be
increasing at j.
Now suppose that j00  bnc is the smallest value of j at which jB(j) is decreasing, or
equivalently, jj  B(j +1): Since j00 is less than the mode, this inequality must hold for
all j between j00 and the mode by the same reasoning given above, i.e. jj is increasing
in j until the mode and B(j +1) is strictly decreasing in j. If no such value exists, jB(j)
is increasing throughout.
3. For jB(j) to be increasing throughout, we require the mode to be greater than (n   1)
and in addition, using (8), (n   1)n 1 < n. We can rewrite this inequality as
n(n   1)





1 + n(n   1)
However, at the values of  satisfying the above condition, n > n   1 so that M  n 1:
Proof of Proposition 1
16The largest loan available under an individual contract is given by Li = K
r as seen in equation







Using (1), K can be expressed in terms of Li and we can rewrite the above condition as
n > jB(j)
We show that this is always true. The LHS is the expectation of a Binomial distribution with










k = jB(j): (9)
Proof of Proposition 2
We start with the rst part of the proposition and show that individual contracts can be
implemented as group loans under the stated conditions on n and . When social sanctions are
higher than     K, we show that even if returns take their minimum value of  , repayment is
feasible for low values of .





Li   












Now, since Li = K
r < 1, r


















17The rest of the proof uses two well-known results on the binomial distribution from Kaas and
Buhrman (1980). The rst is that for integer values of the mean n, the median, m, is equal
to the mean. The second is that for non-integer values of the mean, the median is either dne,
the smallest integer above the mean or bnc, the largest integer below the mean.
We will rst prove the result for integer values of n, with   1
2. We will then consider
non-integer values of n and nally show that Li is always a feasible group loan when n = 2.
If n is an integer, set j0 = n = m. The inequality in (10) is now
  B(m)
But since m is the median, B(m)  1
2 so with   1
2 this is always true.
Now consider non-integer values of the mean. The median in this case must either be dne or
bnc. If the median m = dne then set j0 = dne in (10). Since n < dne, the LHS is of (10)
is smaller than when n is an integer and the result goes through a fortiori.
If instead m = bnc, consider rst j0 = dne = 1. In this case n is strictly less than 1 and
(10) holds if B(1) > . But B(1) = 1   (1   )n so this is always true. If dne > 1, set















m+1 is increasing in m and takes its minimum value of 1
2 when j = 2. The minimum
value taken by B(m) is also 1
2, so the above inequality holds whenever   1
4.
For the case where n = 2, set j0 = 2 and (10) can now be expressed as 2
2
2
B(2)  1. But B(2) = 2,
so this holds with equality.
We nally show that for large  and n > 2, there always exist loan sizes that will be implemented
as individual but not group contracts.
By Lemma 1, the function jB(j) is maximized at j = n when  >
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1) and we know that
B(n) = n. If the group loan is equal to Li; each successful member in the group is required to
18contribute r















Required payments are therefore higher than   whenever
Li >
n
   n 1 + n:
If n > 2, the RHS of the above expression is smaller than one and there exist loan sizes Li that
are not feasible group loans even for arbitrarily high social sanctions.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since we are considering the case where sanctions limit the size of group loans ( > K +), the




















Note that since jB(j) depends only on group size n and the probability of project success, ,






We have therefore shown that the marginal eect of sanctions is positive for both types of loans
and larger for individual loans. If the initial level of Li is at least equal to Lg, then the largest
individual loan after the increase in sanctions must also be greater than the largest group loan.
Proof of Proposition 5
The utility from individual and group loans is given by Equations (2) and (5) respectively. The
marginal eect of a rise in social sanctions for group loans is given by [B(j0) B(j)]K, where
j0 is the number of successes required in the most favorable group contract for a particular loan
size after the change in social sanctions and j is the corresponding number before the change.
Since j0  j, the second term is non-negative and the relative gain from group lending goes up.
19In a similar fashion, we can derive the change in welfare from an increase in bank sanctions.
The marginal eect of higher sanctions, K, on individual loans is given by
@Ui
@K
=  (1   ):
This reects the higher expected cost of the sanction. For group loans, we once again need to
account of the change in the most favorable contract oered for each loan size. The change in
utility from group loans is now given by
@Ug
@K
=  [1   B(j
0)] + [B(j
0)   B(j)]  K:
Since j0  j and since we are considering the case in which group contracts are strictly preferred







Proof of Proposition 6
From Lemma 1 we know that, for a group of size n the maximum loan size Lg(n) is obtained at
j = n if  
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1). For a group of size n   1, the maximum loan size Lg(n   1) is obtained






1+(n 1)(n 2), if  
n(n 1)
1+n(n 1), the largest
loans for both these group sizes require all members to succeed.
We know that the largest group loan for a given group size is given by (4). Therefore for 
larger than the above threshold, the largest group loans for each of these group sizes is therefore
given by
r
B(n   1;n   1;)




Lg(n) = min(;K + )
If the values of  and  are large enough for Lg(n) > Li, then since B(n;n;) < B(n 1;n 1;),
Lg(n) < Lg(n   1) and outreach is larger for the smaller group .
For a borrowers that requires a loan of size Lg(n), we can use (5) to derive the utility gain from
being in a group of size (n 1) rather than a group of size n as [B(n 1;n 1;) B(n;n;)]K
which is strictly positive.
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